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2017] A CONTINENT DIVIDED: NATIONALISMAND THE EUROPEAN UNION
PANEL 3: THE RULE OF LAW CRISIS IN POLAND AND HUNGARY
Carmen Gonzalez: Hello everyone. We're going to get started on our third
panel for the day discussing the rule of law crisis in Poland and Hungary and with
that I'm going to turn it over to Professor Mark Janis.
Mark Janis: Well thank you to you all for sticking around for the best part of
today's conference. I speak to you as an American and a little bit of an Englishman
and of course I speak with distance from all of this because as you know England
and America have never really been part of the European project. I graduated law
school in England in 1972 and the right answer to the exam question, could or should
Great Britain become part of the European Union or the Common Market, was then
"no". One of the leaders of the European Union just a few months ago said and was
widely reported in England speaking about Brexit saying, "It's going to be an awfully
messy divorce, but frankly it was never a happy marriage". Britain never as you
know, most Brits, never really accepted the European project. They accepted certain
parts of the promise of the European Union but it's always been a different story and
the same is of course true even more so for the United States. Many of our ancestors
came here not to be European and isolationism here has always been strong. It really
took the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to turn us away from isolationism in the
1930s when somebody coined a phrase now recently reemerged called "America
First". Still, an English poet John Donne once wrote "Ask not for whom the bell
tolls. It tolls for thee". And so what happens in Europe affects Americans and it also
effects the British. In fact, the British are even closer. As the old British saying often
goes: clouds over the channel, Europe is isolated.
When I look at this part of today's program, I think of the last hundred years.
Not just back to 1945 but back to 1914 and the First World War and the great
transformation in European society. Back in 1914. say you had the British Empire,
Austria-Hungarian Empire, German Empire, French Empire, Russian Empire, and it
was really a very different sort of place socially, economically, culturally. The First
World War was of course the great dissolver of all of that. E.H. Carr, the man who
among others invented a discipline now called international politics or international
relations that's taught in many universities, wrote in the 1930s about what he called
the 20-year crisis, you know from 1919 to 1939. And at this point in time with E.H.
Carr we can really talk about an 80-year crisis. As Europe has struggled to find a
new model if you will, the old model that it developed over time cracked in the early
part of the 20th century and Europe has been struggling with a new model for 100
years.
Throughout much of the 20th century, the debate was among three groups. There
were the fascists, there were the communists, and there were the liberals. If we were
holding this conference here or anywhere in Europe in the 1930s we might have been
taught that it was going to be the liberals who would lose, that the future was either
with the fascists or with the communists. It didn't turn out that way. The weak sister
ended up prevailing and at the end of the Second World War it was more or less the
liberal democracies that in terms of economies and power, economic and military
held sway. In the liberal democracies, the format was largely based on three sets of
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rights. The first one was property rights. That is people who had property, should be
able to protect their property against government. The second right was the right of
majorities. Short translation of which is called democracy. That the majority should
be able to rule.
And those two rights, or you could call them legs of a table of the rights of the
liberal democracies have stood up pretty well. There's a lot of protection for private
property. There's a lot of respect for majoritarianism. It's the third leg in the table
that's given many countries huge problems and I don't subtract England and America
from having those huge problems. That third leg of the stool is the protection of
minorities against both property rights, the wealthy people, and majority rights,
democracy. And there's a new term which I think was coined not so many years ago,
10-15 years ago called the illiberal democracy which is based only on two legs of
the stool: property rights and democracy. Illiberal democracies explicitly repudiate
the third stool which is respect for minorities. Whether they be political minorities
or economic majorities or alien minorities or ethnic minorities or religious
minorities. The idea is that democracy should rule. Now as many of the panelists
before us have mentioned two of the shining examples of illiberal democracies are
Hungary and Poland and we have three wonderful panelists who are going to tell us
first about Poland and Hungary and then about a success story in Romania. So, we
have two Daniels and a Vlad. Let me introduce the first Daniel, Daniel Kelemen,
thank you.
Daniel Kelemen: All right, thanks very much. Thanks to Carmen and the
organizers for having me, and to all of you for coming. And I think, as was said
before, the organizers have done a great job organizing a conference that addresses
different aspects of the "polycrisis" - the multiple intersecting crises that the EU is
facing. We've talked about two of them already, the Brexit crisis and the Eurozone
crisis. We could have also addressed perhaps the refugee crisis, and now we're going
to talk about the rule of law or democracy crisis. Maybe it is not useful to rank them
- and I don't want to belittle the significance of the others - but I would say that the
crisis we're going to talk about here is the most profound and existential one for the
EU. I'd put it this way-with the Eurozone crisis, the EU can lose money. The Brexit
crisis is kind of like losing an arm - an important part of its body politic. In the
refugee crisis, quite horrifically, vulnerable people can lose their lives. But this crisis
of the rule of law and democracy is one in which, to echo the Ambassador, Europe
can lose its eternal soul. Let me explain what I mean by that.
So, what I'm going to talk about really is the backsliding from democracy
toward authoritarianism in a couple of member states in the EU. Specifically, I'm
going to talk about why the EU hasn't done more about it to stop it and the threat it
opposes to the fundamental values of the union. And let me just start by sort of laying
out a couple of my premises before I get to my analysis so you know where I'm
coming from. You might ask what kind of regime exists in Hungary? What kind of
regime is being put into place in Poland there? It has only been in motion for a year
so it is less far along, but I want to say I won't give into this idea of calling them
illiberal democracies-- that's the term from Fareed Zakaria from a decade ago. I
mean I think that term is an oxymoron and a sort of euphemism for reasons I can
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explain later, but I view these as electoral authoritarian regimes. So, they have
elections, yes, but not totally free and fair ones necessarily. They are often biased in
favor of the dominant party. And while they have elections, they are authoritarian in
many other respects, as I'll describe. Crucially attacks on the rule of law and on the
independence of the judiciary are an integral part of the consolidation of this kind of
electoral authoritarianism.
These governments go after other institutions too, such as the press and NGOs,
but going after the judiciary is always step one or two in the formation of these types
of regimes. So, our conference or our panel is about a rule of law crisis, but for me
it's simultaneously about a democracy crisis.
So, I want to talk about the democratic deficit in the EU. My use of the term
might sound odd because you have heard this term used differently by Peter Lindseth
and other people who study the EU; when they talk about the democratic deficit, they
mean a deficit of democracy at the EU level? Normally the term refers to the idea
that EU institutions are too detached from the people, that they're not electorally
accountable enough, et cetera. And this extensive literature criticizes the lack of
democratic legitimacy of EU institutions. Well what I would push us to think about,
for the purposes of my talk, is to sort of flip that notion on its head and say that the
really important democracy deficit threatening Europe now is not at the EU level but
at the national level in national capitals like Budapest and Warsaw.
Any democratic deficiencies the EU may have pale in comparison to what is
happening in these member states. After I describe what has been happening in these
countries, I come to my central question: why has the EU failed to do more about it?
After all, democracy and the rule of law were conditions of membership for countries
in the EU, these countries that joined. The EU treaties contain a list of the
fundamental values of the EU in Article 2 which include democracy and the rule of
law and there is even a procedure that was put in in the treaty Article 7 for basically
imposing sanctions on states who violate those fundamental values of the union, yet
nothing much has been done, especially in the case of Hungary.
What I'm going to ask us to think about, to understand this is to think of the EU
as a kind of quasi federal system that is democratic, broadly speaking, at the federal
level, but that has pockets of authoritarianism at the state or member state level.
When you think about it that way, sadly it shouldn't be that surprising that you have
some autocratic member states in this federal union, because in fact there's a big
literature in comparative politics that tells us this is very common in big federations.
See a couple quotes from prominent scholars in this field on my slides. I'll just read
one of them from Ed Gibson from Northwestern, "Subnational authoritarianism is a
fact of life in most democracies in the developing or post-communist world." What
they mean by that is there are again states within otherwise broadly democratic
federations where authoritarianism can persist for a long time. This should be no
surprise to us here in America because of course we had it ourselves for decades.
You've all heard of the solid south, right? And you know we had a form of
authoritarianism in some southern states when the federation as a whole is
democratic. Such subnational authoritiarianism is common in some Latin American
countries also. In Argentina, after the military rule was ousted they still had
authoritarian leaders in some states like in San Luis for decades. In Mexico too, as
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the national government democratized, some states remained authoritarian. This
literature offers lessons about how local authoritarians survive in unions that are
supposedly committed to democracy. The answer is, in short, party politics, and we
are going to translate that story over to the EU, and then we can see the much the
same is happening in Europe. In short, this literature shows that if the local
authoritarian delivers votes or seats to a national party or coalition of parties at the
national level, that that coalition needs to wield power nationally, they will protect
and tolerate their local authoritarian - just like the Democratic party did for its
southern democrats, in the US. And that's basically what's happening in the EU as
we'll get to later in this talk.
This literature can also tell us something about when these authoritarian
enclaves fall in these federal systems. Again, it is usually due to party politics. If the
national party of which the authoritarian state is a member eventually finds them too
embarrassing and worries that being associated with the authoritarian leader or party
in that state would damage the national party's reputation, then they may dump them
or pressure them to change their ways. Likewise, if the opposition parties nationally
can intervene forcefully to support the local beleaguered opposition and help them
mobilize more effectively, that could dislodge the local authoritarian.
One final theoretical point - and then I'll talk about Hungary and Poland: I think
the problem we have in the EU today, essentially, is that the EU is in in what I view
as an "authoritarian equilibrium." To address complaints about the democratic
deficit at the EU level, the EU has given more importance to the European Parliament
in policy-making. Also, they've given parliament a role in selecting the president of
the European Commission, which is the EU's executive. All of this has upped the
stakes of having a majority in the European parliament, and that in turn has upped
the stakes of having European party groups stick together so they can run the EU.
But that means that they'll stick together, even if that means protecting a local
authoritarian who is one of their team. And that is I think the problem we face now
and that is what has given Victor Orban so much cover as his fellow members of the
European People's Party have protected his semi-authoritarian regime from EU
pressure.
Alright, so, what is happening in Hungary? I mean how did we get to the point
where in just the last two weeks - and by the way these are is just the latest
abominations. We could go back over the past six years to see more - but just in
recent weeks we have Hungarian parliament enact a law that asylum seekers are
going to be subject to mandatory detention in containers at the border; we've seen
them pass a law yesterday that would force the closure of the highest ranked and only
remaining really independent university in the country, the central European
University funded by the American-- Hungarian American financier George Soros;
and also we have seen Orbdn has just launched a "Let's stop Brussels" referendum
which is actually like a "push-poll" where he's going to send all of these, mailings
to every household saying "What's the area where Brussels is taking too much power
away from us?" et cetera. The chutzpah is incredible. He put these placards of "Let's
stop Brussels" for instance all over the subway in Budapest which was funded by EU
money.
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But how did we get there and how did we get to a leader who started out as a
liberal freedom fighter against communism now being the best friend in the EU of
the former KGB agent, Putin? Well, I can't tell the whole story, and I've only got a
few minutes so I'm going to be very fast but essentially what happened in the
Hungarian case is a kind of constitutional revolution. In the wake of a scandal in the
governing party of the left, Fidesz, which is Orban's party, won a big majority in
2010. Fair and square they won a majority of votes, which translated into 2/3 of the
seats in the parliament. The Hungarian constitution allowed that if you had 2/3 of the
seats, you could rewrite the constitution. You had total power essentially, no checks
and balances once you had 2/3 of the seats in parliament, and they did. So they
rewrote the constitution doing moves to consolidate power and eliminate checks and
balances, replace holders of any independent offices within government and then
right away one of their key moves was attacking the judiciary. They packed the
constitutional court enlarging its size so they could add Fidesz appointees and
therefore get a majority in the constitutional court. They did other things like force
early retirement ofjudges across the whole system to get rid of senior judges so then
they could put in more Fidesz judges. They created a new office that would manage
the judiciary, headed by the way by the wife of the guy who rewrote the constitution
on his iPad, both of whom went to university with OrbAn. They were all law students
together. Then Orbdn's government attacked the independent media, closed down
opposition newspapers, et cetera, attacked civil society organizations and NGOs.
And by the way, they've just presented a new law - I think today - modeled on Putin's
foreign agents law to require registration of any NGO's with foreign funding. That
is again going after Soros and others. But back to the past - in the run up to the 2014
election, they changed the electoral law to favor their Fidesz party and to try to assure
that they would win. Once they won the reelection in 2014 using this new electoral
system, then Orbdn was out in the open about his ambitions. He said I'm going to
build an illiberal democracy modeled on Turkey, China, Russia. Ok now I'm going
to fast forward because I'm running out of time but some people look at this, and
they say the problem is that the EU had lacked adequate tools to stop erosion of
democracy and the Commission didn't enforce things strictly enough. Maybe they
just need new tools of enforcement but I would say that partly traditional tools of
enforcing EU law case by case, issue by issue don't work when really there's a macro
thing going on which is a systemic attack on the rule of law and democracy. Case by
case, you can't capture that. Likewise, relying on private enforcement by individuals
to defend their EU rights doesn't work when some of the issues in question aren't
justiciable. Like you can't bring a case for the fact the judiciary is not independent,
right? And also, once he's captured the whole judiciary that whole mechanism of
private enforcement won't work and then this nuclear option of Article 7 in the treaty
where all the other states by unanimity could agree to punish the country, that doesn't
work because of that high bar of unanimity, and there were those willing to protect
Orban. But that brings me back to my partisan story.
Why has Orban gotten away with this? Orban's party is a member of the
European people's party which is the party of the center right, which CDU in
Germany is a member of, and also the Republicans in France. So, it is the center right
party even though he's drifted far to the far right and become authoritarian, they
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protect him non-stop and they have up with his actions. Only last week did the party's
unity start to break it appears because of the attack on Central European University,
but for 6 years they've defended him non-stop against criticism because he delivers
the votes they need to have a majority at the EU level and because he's their co-
partisan.
In my last minute I'll say Poland has been a bit different and I can't tell the
whole story but just in the past year Kaczyiski came into power promising that he
was going to "bring Budapest to Warsaw" - to do the same thing in Poland that Orbdn
did in Hungary. They won a majority, immediately tried to pack the constitutional
court and eliminate the independence to the judiciary, they're still in the midst of a
constitutional crisis where the government won't publish the constitutional courts
decisions, et cetera. Poland has gotten into a bit more hot water though where the
Commission has been more aggressive and triggered the beginnings of what could
lead to Article 7, because Kaczyfiski's party is not part of the European People's
Party. It is in a much weaker party group at the EU level, composed of more far right
parties. Their only powerful party ally is the Tories, but they're on their way out the
door, so they've lost leverage. So Kaczyfiski's been alone, and I think that's why
there's been more action against him shortly, but we'll have to see how it unfolds.
So just to conclude if I could. I have 30 seconds left. What could the EU do better
about this? They could bring more infringement proceedings and be more aggressive.
I don't think that will solve things. They could invoke Article 7, and suspend voting
rights. I think they should. The problem now is there are two authoritarians, the
Polish and the Hungarian governments, who swear to block action against the other.
So you can only do it if you act against both simultaneously. Eventually I think the
only way to get at these regimes is to find ways to threaten, to cut off their EU
funding which they rely on, or for the center right to find its principles and to
denounce Orbdn and what he's doing and there's a fight going on within the party
about that. The center right in Europe has to eventually decide whether they want to
be the party of center-right democracy or go down in history as the party that
defended the rise of autocracy within the EU. Thank you.
Daniel Hegediis: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for having me. I am greatly
honored by the opportunity today to be able to contribute to this symposium. In my
presentation, I would like to touch upon the issue of the interaction between the
European Union and the Hungarian government, and especially the role of the EU in
the Hungarian democratic backsliding process. But before doing so, please allow me
to briefly address the issue of a very actual concern of Hungarian democracy today.
During the last two weeks, the Hungarian government rendered the functioning
of the Central European University illegal by a very discriminative legislation, and
rejected any consultations with the stakeholders of the academic community in
Hungary. Due to the fact that the CEU, as a mission driven university, promotes
democracy and liberal values in Central Europe, the attacks of the Hungarian
government against the university shouldn't only be considered a great violation of
academic freedom, but also as a further symbolic step showing the Hungarian
government's disrespect toward the common liberal democratic value base of
Western democracies. Bearing the fact in mind that CEU operates as an American
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university in Budapest, the Hungarian academic community would highly appreciate
if it could count on your solidarity in this very actual issue.
Coming back to my presentation, the Hungarian developments are frequently
compared to Russia and Turkey, and therefore Hungary is also often labeled as a
kind of illiberal democracy. Of course, these comparisons can be seen useful to
underline the direction of authoritarian trends in the country, however they do not
necessarily contribute to the understanding of the key characteristics of a very unique
hybrid regime existing within the democratic community of the European Union.
In my presentation, I would like to provide an analysis of the Hungarian
developments from the perspective of hybrid regimes theories. Based on the
inductive theorization of the Hungarian regime's unique characteristics, I would like
to offer the theoretical model of the "externally constrained hybrid regime", what we
developed together with Prof. Andrds Boz6ki from the Central European University,
as an explanation regarding the question how the contemporary political system of
Hungary could be best described and categorized.
What are these unique characteristics mentioned before? Up to now, Hungary is
the first and until now the only former Western type, consolidated liberal democracy
which left the democratic development past behind, and evolved to a kind of hybrid
regime. I said the only one, because I am convinced that in the case of Poland one
still cannot observe any systemic repercussion of the quality of democracy. Poland
is only temporarily a defective democracy. Not as Hungary, where a constitutional
capture situation evolved, and in the case if Mr. Orbdu would lose the next elections,
it would be still a really hard task to bring the country back to the democratic
development path. At this point I would like to point-out that hybridization is not a
one-way process, as it was seen until now in the mainstream political science
literature. Hybrid regimes cannot only develop as consequences of stuck or
incomplete democratization processes, but as one can see in the case of Hungary,
even consolidated liberal democracies can develop back to a kind of hybrid regime
or start following an authoritarian development past.
Concerning the second unique characteristic, Hungary is the first ever hybrid
regime in the European Union, and the country's EU membership has crucial
systemic effects on the regime's functioning. That means that as an EU Member
State with questionable democratic quality, Hungary calls for the partial revision of
the linkage/leverage theory of Levitsky and Way arguing that the stronger are the
links between a country and the Western democratic community, and the more
influence the Western democratic community can exercise over a country, the higher
are the chances of democratic consolidation. In a global comparison. Hungary
unquestionably used to belong to the internal circle of liberal democracies. However,
the Hungarian case underlines the fact that the systemic deconstruction of liberal
democracy was still possible within the European Union. Therefore, also that
political discourse should be partially revised, which defines the European Union as
a family of democratic member states.
Changing the focus to the role of the European Union, I would like to argue that
from a system theory perspective the European Union should not merely be
considered as a kind of international environment for its Member States. The EU
should rather be seen as a multi-level polity, a common supra-national, federal
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superstructure of the political systems of its Member States. Being in this form a part
of the national political systems, the European Union fulfills several system
functions for its Member States. Regarding democratic quality, the EU not only
opposes the democratic backsliding process of a Member State, what I call the EU's
'constraining function', but it can also contribute to the survival of defective
democracies and hybrid regimes under EU jurisdiction. Furthermore, it can also
support the legitimacy of such regimes. These three 'system constraining', 'system
supporting', and 'system legitimizing' functions could be identified as the EU's key
functions toward its Member States with systemic democratic deficit. Although as
already mentioned, these functions are not identical for all countries within the EU,
they can be considered fairly identical for Member States, which are net beneficiaries
of the EU cohesion transfers, and show clear symptoms of democratic backsliding.
Focusing first on the 'constraining function', it must be emphasized that the
European Union is built on the principles of democracy and liberal constitutionalism,
as it is formulated in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union. As the
fundamental principles of the European Union are also binding for the Member
States, it could be perceived on the basis of Article 2 TEU that if Member States
seriously violate these values, they also have to face certain consequences, including
the possibility of sanctions. However, as the competencies of the European Union
vary extensively among the different fields of democracy, fundamental rights, or
checks and balances, the level of adopted standards and the existence of nuanced
benchmarks can also diverge.
Although Hungary is often labelled as 'illiberal democracy', bearing the regimes
key characteristics in mind, it hardly complies with the illiberal democracy definition
of Fareed Zakaria. On the one hand, instead of the low level of human rights, the
quality of fundamental freedoms can be considered rather fair in the country. If only
the quality of human rights and fundamental freedoms should be put under the
microscope, Hungary would most probably qualify as liberal democracy. On the
other hand, representative democracy is seriously compromised and the existence of
an 'uneven political playing field' is clearly identifiable in Hungary. Although the
term of 'rule of law crisis' is actually widely used within the EU, 'democracy crisis'
would be a better suiting terminology for the Hungarian case, as it offers a more
precise, and more comprehensive explanation of the democratic backsliding
phenomenon. Not only the institutional checks and balances are lacking, but the
process of democratic competition is also seriously unfair, thus the country qualify
as a hybrid regime between democracy and authoritarianism, for example as
'competitive authoritarianism' described by Levitsky and Way.
The reason behind this complex situation is the diverging quality of the EU's
constraining function. On the one hand, lacking both the ideal legal toolkit as well
as the firm political will to act, the European Union could not hinder the evisceration
of "checks and balances" and the rule of law in Hungary. Nevertheless, it influenced
and slowed down the process in some respects. The sheer fact that the Hungarian
government has had to consider possible European reactions led to the famous
'peacock dance' policy of Mr. Orbin. On the other hand, based on the individual
legal remedy option provided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and
on the fact that the European Convention on Human Rights and the ECtHR case-low
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constitute an inseparable part of EU law, the EU has been able to secure a rather fair
level of fundamental rights and individual liberties in Hungary. Present days, not the
Hungarian constitutional institutions, like the Constitutional Court or the
ombudsperson are the final guardians of the Hungarian citizens' fundamental
freedoms, but the EU and the ECtHR.
To provide reference to the growing role of the ECtHR in the safeguarding of
the fundamental rights of Hungarian citizens, the following data could be mentioned.
The number of Hungarian applications to the ECtHR in Strasbourg rose between
2010 and 2016 by 1,177 percent. Currently Hungary has the highest number of
applications on per capita basis in the whole Council of Europe region. While
Hungary only counts for 1.25 percent of the population in the Council of Europe, it
is responsible for 10.41 percent of all pending cases in Strasbourg. These figures also
demonstrate the existence of the 'external constrain', which safeguards Hungarian
citizens' fundamental rights and freedoms, and withholds the country from a further
advance in a more authoritarian direction.
Switching our focus to the 'system sustaining function', Hungary receives
approximately 3.2 percent of its annual GDP through transfers of the European
cohesion policy. Although intended to provide public investments and facilitate
economic growth, these European cohesion transfers also contribute to the
abundance of misusable funds in the country. Hence, they create a financial incentive
for the hybrid regime's elite to tolerate the above mentioned constraining function.
Furthermore, they also stabilize the regime in general economic terms.
According to Freedom House, Hungary can be characterized by a phenomenon
of 'reverse state capture', meaning that not public interests capture the state, but the
state organizes and maintains its own corruption networks. Pursuant to the data
published by Transparency International, 70 percent of all Hungarian public
procurement tenders is affected by corruption, while the overpricing in these tenders
totals up to 25 percent. Bearing in mind the above described nature and extent of
corruption in Hungary, it is rather easily understandable how EU financial transfers
contribute to the survival of the hybrid regime.
Coming to the last function, the system legitimizing function, the lack of proper
EU sanctions on Hungary due to the non-compliance with EU fundamental values,
like democracy or rule of law, leaves the impression behind as Hungary still would
be a kind of functioning liberal democracy. Unsurprisingly this argumentation is
heavily exploited by the Hungarian government both in domestic and international
context, and it helps to maintain the regime's democratic legitimacy. Last but not
least, it contributes to a self-sustaining vicious circle of non-sanctioning democratic
backsliding in the European Union.
Finally, I would like to sum up some conclusions. On the one hand, the EU's
constraining function has been effective in that cases, when EU actions have had
solid legal basis, like on the field of fundamental rights, concerning the case of the
planned reintroduction of capital punishment. On the other hand the constraining
function has been rather ineffective, when objective benchmarks were missing, like
on the field of 'rule of law' and 'checks and balances'. These differences in the
standard setting result in the strengths and weaknesses of the EU's constraining
function, which influenced the main characteristics of the Hungarian hybrid regime.
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Concerning the qualities of the regime, on the one hand I agree with Dan
Kelemen that Hungary doesn't qualify as an illiberal democracy as defined by Fareed
Zakaria. However, according to my opinion it doesn't qualify, because the level of
fundamental rights is more or less tolerably high. On the other hand, I am convinced
that the 'competitive authoritarianism' theory of Levitsky and Way offers the best
explanation of the Hungarian regime characteristics, as the country clearly shows the
key defining benchmark of 'competitive authoritarianism', the 'uneven political
playing field' or systemically unfair political competition. At this point I only would
like to refer to the fact, that the OSCE, the Organization of Security and Cooperation
in Europe, classified the 2014 Hungarian parliamentary elections as 'free but not
fair', meaning that one of the fundamental benchmarks of democratic elections was
not fulfilled in an EU member state. Hence in my eyes, and again I agree with Dan
Kelemen, Hungary doesn't undergo a rule of law crisis. Hungary, an EU Member
State, shows clear signs of a very serious crisis of democracy.
How can this situation be changed in the future? As East-Central-Europeans are
predominantly pessimistic, I would like to call the attention on two possible negative
scenarios. The first scenario can take place, if the European Union cancels its
generous cohesion policy during the renegotiations of the Multiannual Financial
Framework (MFF), or denies the access to it for countries, which are not complying
with the EU's fundamental values. In this case, without the appropriate financial
incentive, Hungary could probably lose its interest in the membership, and can strive
to an EU exit to also abandon the Union's constraining function.
Or, in the second case, if the French or the German elections take a wrong
direction during 2017, the EU can cease to function as a liberal political and value
community in the future, and can abandon its own external constraining function as
well. Bearing the fact in mind that both cases result in a situation that there won't be
any external pressure on Member States for democratic compliance, under these
conditions Hungary and Poland could continue theirjourneys in the direction of more
authoritarian waters. Thank you very much for your attention.
Vlad Perju: I would like to start by echoing Daniel's point about standing in
solidarity with the Central European University. The actions of the Orban
government have been particularly reprehensible. The Central European University
has been over the past two decades or so, really one of the most extraordinary success
stories of academic innovation in Eastern Europe. It has drawn brilliant students from
all over the region. It has put them into contact with cutting edge research in their
respective fields. The university has built extraordinarily successful departments. So,
I hope that you will consider adding your name to one of these petitions that are
circulating around about standing in solidarity with CEU.
As the last panelist of the day I have the opportunity to draw some connections
with the discussions that have been going on before. Dan Kelemen presented the
various crises of the EU and talked about ranking them. For myself, I think it's really
interesting to what extent the story we are telling in this panel is quite different from
the stories that have been told in the previous panels. I invite you to check, according
to your own political intuitions, if these accounts align or they don't align. The Brexit
situation and the Brexit panel have been essentially about how Brexit is a tragedy for
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which the EU itself is partly responsible. For instance, the Union's political
institutions are insufficiently responsive. It has, we were told, a European Court of
Justice that has over- constitutionalized European politics. Its democratic deficit
continues to be unmitigated. It is thus no wonder that things turned out the way they
did with the Brexit vote. The Eurozone crisis panel has given us a similarly complex
story. The gist of it was that, while some of the choices that have been made at the
national level might be questionable, there is a lot to blame on the EU's methods for
reaching major political decisions. Think, in this context, of the so-called voluntary
bail-out (voluntary, as it has been correctly pointed out, only in the Inquisition sense
of the term). Here, in the "rule of law" last panel of the day, we are offering a
different account. That account, and I think that Dan put it very nicely, is about deep
democratic (and constitutional) deficits at the national level. So, we're here looking
at what kind of pressure the European institutions can put on national processes. In
other words, we're asking a question that is really quite significant from the
perspective of European constitutionalism, namely how the European Union can
intervene in the relation between a national government and their own citizens. In
this context, like the previous speakers, I too want to challenge labelling the situation
in Hungary and Poland as moving in a direction that is sometimes referred to as
illiberal democracy. Not because these regimes are not illiberal - of course they are
- but they are also anti-democratic. While, formally speaking, they appear to have
remained committed to the continuation of the regular electoral cycle, many of the
reforms - from media control to reforms of electoral laws - reflect no commitment to
a genuinely open completion for power among pluralist forces. Moreover, we have
come to understand democracy as more than just showing up to vote on a given day.
It is important in a democracy what happens in the period leading up to the vote, the
kind of public deliberation that goes on. Those processes have been short circuited
on purpose in Hungary and in Poland, and we should not turn a blind eye to these
developments.
A second, and related, point concerns the element of surprise about the turn of
political events in Hungary and Poland. The common reaction to that situation has
been along the lines of: "the European Union let them in and all of a sudden look
what they're doing. Who would have thought?" In reality, if one had actually paid
attention, one might have seen this coming. I recommend, in this context, a
conversation from 2007 between Vaclav Havel, the intellectual then-president of the
Czech Republic, and Adam Michnik, the Polish dissident. Havel asks Michnik if he
saw the situation at the time in Poland exceptional from the larger political
developments in Central and Eastern Europe. Michnik answers: Poland is in no way
an exception. I could give multiple examples from other countries. A Slovak
coalition, the Euro Skeptic rhetoric of Vaclav Klaus, the anti-communist radicalism
of Viktor Orban who reinvented himself in his career. The post-communist
radicalism of Viktor Yanukovych. [Yanukovych, in case you don't remember, is the
former president of the Ukraine who's now a tenant in Hotel Putin. The real model
is the consistent and effective authoritarianism of Vladimir Putin. We should look at
the practices of Putin to understand the nature of the threats to democracy in
countries in post-communist Europe." Looking back at this prediction a decade later,
we should keep in mind - as GnAinne de Bfirca told us this morning - that there are
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specificities to each of these jurisdictions. At the same time, as Michnik's prediction
shows, one should also understand what brings together the different experiences,
what makes them be part of the same wave. In this second dimension, what stands
out is cross-learning among jurisdictions that turn authoritarian. Methods of
undermining democracy and constitutionalism have been traveling across borders.
They are tested in one place, then whatever works travels and is used in another
place. So, there have been a lot of migration of constitutional techniques that we have
seen over the past decade or so.
I want to take this as a starting point for my intervention about a jurisdiction
where things could have turned out as badly as they have in Hungary and Poland -
but didn't. That jurisdiction is Romania. We need to understand why constitutional
democracy in Romania did not implode, and specifically the EU's role.
If you had placed yourself 5 years ago, in the summer of 2012, the EU's most
urgent political problems included the the explosion of Roma by the French, the fast
pace at which Viktor Orban undermined the constitutional state in Hungary, and,
finally, the crisis of the rule of law in Romania.
Very briefly, about what happened in Romania - and, I should add, this is
representative of the pace at which the rule of law crisis unfolds in various
jurisdictions. Romania is a mixed, semi-presidential system, where the president is
directly elected and the president and the prime minister both have executive
authority A common challenge to all mixed regimes that are EU members is to decide
who will be representing the country in the European Council. As Federico pointed
out earlier today, the European Council brings together heads of state or of the
government. What happens when there is both a head of state and the head of
government? The question is particularly urgent in a situation of so-called
cohabitation, when the president and prime-minister belong to opposing political
forces. In many mixed jurisdictions, such a Finland, Poland and now Romania, the
question about who gets to represent the country in the European Council typically
goes up to the constitutional court. The court decides, and the political actors abide
by that decision. But, in Romania's case, there is a twist. No long before the Court's
decision came down, holding that the president has the competence to participate in
the European Council meetings and that the prime minister can represent the country
only when expressly delegated by the president, control over the Official Journal
changed from Parliament to the Executive. This matters because the decisions of the
Constitutional Court must be published before they can come into effect. And the
Executive delayed the publication of the decision of the constitutional court on
participation in the European Council by long enough for the prime minister to get
on that flight to Brussels to attend the meeting of the European Council.
Then the next thing that happened, within a matter of days, concerned the
Ombudsman. I should mention that this is happening in July, when the members of
Romanian parliament are on vacation. Now, Romanian MPs take their vacation very
seriously, as you could imagine. Probably even if Mr. Putin was to declare war on
Romania, the members of Parliament would be hard-pressed to reconvene. So, all of
a sudden, an extraordinary session of the Romanian parliament is called in the middle
of July. What for? The official reason was to assess the activity of the Ombudsman.
Now, I should tell you that the ombudsman is not particularly distinguished
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institution in the country's overall institutional architecture. The position has been
occupied by individuals of no particular distinction, or who, in any event, did not
want to rock the boat. But the reason why the ombudsman's position mattered in July
2012 was that the only the ombudsman has standing to challenge ex ante, that is,
before coming into effect, the constitutionality of an emergency degree adopted by
the executive. So, in other words, if the ombudsman is politically obedient, the
government can oftentimes make immediate changes in the legal order by using
emergency decrees. So, in the end, the 2012 parliamentary majority managed to
replace the ombudsman and then proceeded to enacting a number of executive
orders, including one that curtailed the jurisdiction of the constitutional court. Still,
the Romanian politicians were not as effective and radical as Poland's Law and
Justice Party, although there is a family resemblance between the two cases. As you
might know, in Poland, the parliamentary majority enacted controls on the docket of
the country's constitutional tribunal, decided on a blocking majority in the
constitutional tribunal, enacted requirements about new quorum requirements in that
judicial body. Furthermore, the Polish executive not only delayed but it went as far
as declining to publish decisions of the constitutional court. You see my point about
how mechanisms for eroding constitutional democracy migrated across jurisdictions.
In Romania, things came to a head when, following the measures I mentioned
above, the parliamentary majority voted to suspend the president. The Constitution
requires a referendum following such a vote in Parliament. In anticipation of the fact
that the president's suspension from office would only be temporary unless
confirmed by a popular referendum, the executive sought to lower the quorum
threshold for deeming referenda valid. The constitutional court stepped in to hold
the lowering of the threshold unconstitutional. Since the court decision derailed the
attempts to remove the president from office - no one believed that the court-
endorsed 50% participation rate of all citizens above voting age in the coming
referendum, which was organized in less than a month, not to mention in the middle
of the summer - the critical question became if the executive and its supporting
parliamentary majority would comply with the decision of the court. One could
envision something similar to the Polish scenario, as it unfolded later. For instance,
would the decision of.the court be published in a timely manner and produce its
effect? The initial signals from the executive showed reluctance to comply. Yet,
eventually, the decision was published and the majority stated that it would comply.
It is true that attempts were made - unsuccessfully - to rig the referendum, and indeed
Mr. Dragnea, the future president of the Social-Democratic Party, which was one of
the two main parties before the effort to unseat the president, would eventually be
criminally convicted for his acts during the referendum. So, why did the political
majority comply with the decision of the Court?
For one, there was tremendous pressure from the European institutions and
especially from within the European socialists with whom Romania's social-
democrats are affiliated. Secondly, also at the supranational level, there was already
an existing mechanism in place, a mechanism for cooperation and verification, that
had been set up at the time when Romania joined the European Union in 2007. The
existence of this mechanism provided the necessary expertise for the European
experts to know the country and be able to interpret, more or less in real time,
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institutional developments. It also provided them a vocabulary that was politically
neutral in which they could frame their demands. But the third, and I think most
important reason why they attempt to undo the constitutional state in Romania failed,
was that the politicians in charge were too inexperienced, too young to follow
through with what would have been an obvious and radical breakdown of the rule of
law pillar of the constitutional state. They blinked in precisely the way that
Kaczynski in Poland or Orban in Hungary never did. Politicians like Victor Ponta,
the then-prime minister, essentially did their own cost benefit calculus on what each
course of action would entail. They decided that giving in to the demands that were
coming from the European Union was more advantageous. It was certainly good for
the country that they reached that decision but it is important to keep in mind that
they also could have decided otherwise. While the implications or risks of the
illegality of disobeying the constitutional court might have been part of the calculus,
it is hard to believe that it played a very big part - precisely because unseating the
president promised to give them control over the judicial system, the kind of control
that would have then immunized them from prosecution. Thus, the decision whether
or not to comply with the court was reached in a space that was more or less de-
juridified. This is relatively clear at the municipal level, but is also arguably true
from the European, supranational perspective. The means available to the European
institutions to influence developments at the national level are essentially political.
In Romania as elsewhere, EU influences through political pressure. As far as the
European court ofjustice is concerned, its role is basically non-existent. Contrast this
to Peter Lindseth's diagnosis earlier, about the overconstitutionalization of the
European space. The following example should make this contrast event more
evident.
A recent development is enormously concerning. It involves the strategic way
in which the concept of identity, of constitutional identity, has been deployed not by
the European Court of Justice but by national constitutional courts. These courts have
essentially drawn lines in the sand to defend the otherwise highly questionable
actions taken by national governments. National/constitutional identity is a concept
born in the decisions of the 1970s of the German constitutional court. The concept
then becomes part of the European treaty through a process that I don't have time to
describe here. What we have seen recently is that, as opposition to Viktor Orban for
example in Hungary is becoming a bit stronger, as Orban no longer has the votes to
enact constitutional amendments in exactly the terms he wants, he can rely on the
constitutional court that by now he controls to defend and entrench his policies. The
umbrella of national constitutional identity has essentially immunized policies of the
Hungarian government that have deeply undermined both constitutionalism and
democracy. This is an extremely important development because, while one might
think that political pressure from the EU might have some effect on the actions of a
national government, we now see those actions being protected by constitutional
courts that have been politically captured. So much for celebrating the concept of
constitutional identity. Rather, this has become the new battlefield on which the fate
of the "rule of law" might turn. Thank you.
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Mark Janis: We have a few minutes for questions. Is that ok? Very good. So
please. Sir?
Audience member: Thank you for your insight. Both the Poles and the
Hungarians live in what has been historically a very dangerous part of the world.
Russia seems to consider that their own buffer zone and with the decline in the
strength of NATO, US is at a distance, I think there's some-- I've read some articles
that suggested that there's some concern within both Hungary as well as Poland
about Russia flexing its muscles and I was just wondering how much of that fear
may have got into the current crisis that we're having in those two countries, the
constitutional crisis?
Daniel Kelemen: I'll say something about that. Yeah, it's a great question. I
mean I think that interestingly Hungary and Poland although their regimes have
much in common in sort of the vision they have for the kind of regime they want to
build; their stance visa vie Russia is very different, right? Where Orban some people
view him as, throw out the term Putin's trojan horse in the EU, right? He's done this
nuclear deal with Russia where he's basically done a contract with the Russians to
build big nuclear power stations in Hungary and even though the EU has the
sanctions regime on Russia in reaction to the invasion of Ukraine, despite that Orban
has had Putin to visit and welcomed him, talk about warming up relations with
Russia, et cetera. You know Poland of course, the Kaczynski regime is very anti-
Russian and they justify some of what they're doing on the kind of nationalist anti-
Russian terms but then strangely their simultaneously kind of anti- German, right?
Which usually you're one or the other but the Pols manage to do both.
Audience Member: Thanks. So, I think it's a question to Dan, but it's probably
a broader question to the panel. So, you talked about how nothing has been done yet
against the breaking down of democracy or whatever, which one you want to call it.
One reason you mentioned was the EPB and how it basically wants Orban for
counting beans in the European parliament but I want to suggest that there is-- that
the problem is deeper and that really it's not just strategic but the EPB has parties
that share many of the-- of Orban's takes on several issues including refugees for
example and here I think that the EU has a problem in the sense that the EU itself is
facing a problem of declining legitimacy based on what it has or has not been doing
on the issue. I'm teaching EU law this semester and we just covered the refugee
crisis, and I just got an email, a very long email from a really unsettled student who
was saying, he was asking me how is it-- I don't understand. How is it that the Turkey
deal doesn't violate the right to non-reformal from the 51 Geneva convention? They
just couldn't wrap their heads around the idea that the deal is numerical, quantitative
one for one. So, the way that the EU is dealing with the refugee crisis, what we've
already done even before it was like a crisis of-- and notice the crisis as we call it
crisis because we think it's a crisis that all these people are coming in as opposed to
there's a crisis because they are refugees and they don't have a home, right? Even
before this crisis we were paying money to Libya for maintaining prisons essentially
and making sure that people don't get on the boats. So, I think the EU is in a very
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tricky position where it's wasted quite a bit of its symbolic capital in that regard. I
wonder what your thoughts are on the topic.
Daniel Kelemen: I'll just say something quickly so others can chime in. I mean
first I agree completely the EU Turkey deal is an abomination and actually I think
people give it credit for stopping the refugee flow which I think is a bit of a mistake.
I think it was more to do with the closure of the Balkan route, but anyway that's
another discussion but I think your first point was yeah that many in the EPB besides
just wanting his votes or his power, they actually agree with his values and I think
that's true. There are many people in the EPB that, specifically with regard to the
Hungarian response to the refugee situation kind of embrace that and certainly Orban
becoming the kind of face of a get-tough stance has helped strengthen him Europe
wide, but just on my specific topic here what I'd point out is this. You know the
refugee deal and Orban's stance on refugees is more of let's say late 2014, 15, and
16, whereas the EPB had been defending him as he eroded democracy already for
years before that was the big issue. So, this-- you know this issue intersected with
that issue but it exists you know separately from it.
Daniel Hegedils: Yeah probably just one further point. If the EPB would change
its position and would not follow this party family based etiquette within the
European parliament it's not only the case of the EPB concerning the previous cases
of Slovakia and Hungary, also the European socialists were not able to sanction their
own party family members. But we clearly see the example of Poland their piece,
their justice parties not belonging to any of the big European party families. The
European Commission could start a rule of law in the spring of 2016. Perhaps it will
finish the procedure without any clear conclusion and without the capability to
sanction Poland as a member state in any form because to a sanctioning you need an
article 7 procedure and any effective concluding of an article 7 procedure in the
European council currently is unrealistic. I only see one point where there is some
development at European level. During the earlier years there was always the
argumentation that the council or the commission anyhow at European level, the
actors do not start an article 7 because if they do not come to the conclusion of any
sanction then it could be interpreted as a kind of failure and now the interpretation
changed and many argued even if we couldn't close an article 7 procedure with
sanctions at least should initiate it and signalize the great concerns concerning the
quality of democracy in these member states.
Mark Janis: Yes, please?
Audience Member: Thanks Mark and thanks to the panel. A great presentation.
I have a question which in a way follows up on this and it's really, Dan, going to
your point about politics but try to understand also the institutional dimension of it.
I think your comparison between what's happening in Europe today and the example
of the United States with the Southern Democrats during the desegregation it's great
in a way how it signals how the democratic party was tolerating behaviors by
members of their party which in fact ideologically speaking were very different from
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what the north conception was but I'm wondering there then to what extent also the
institutional differences between the European Union and the United States matter?
I mean the United States at some point after Brown v. Board of Education, the US
president could send the 101 airborne to police black kids in Little Rock, Arkansas.
In Europe, there's nothing like that. So, you have the party dimension but you don't
have the institutional structure for the center to police compliance at the national
level. Of course, that leads back to my point that I think the lack of an executive
power at the central level in Europe allows the expansion of this crisis. So, my
question to you is how could you ever sort of reform that system and deal with
institutional dimensions with the political dimension as well and just a final
comment-- it's very interesting if you go back to the draft treaty creating European
political community in 1954, one of the power which was given to the super national
authority was precisely to enforce human rights at the state level. So back in the 50s
the concern was that you could have a new fascist regime as you know breaking off
again in one of the member nations and of course that has been-- that was not taken
in the Rome treaty but we are basically back at square one in a way so how do we
solve that problem?
Mark Janis: Let me just toss in one thing. I'm sorry I'm looking at my phone
here because I've left my US Constitution, my pocket edition behind, so it's hard to
do this stuff. As I almost remembered, section 4 of article 4 of the American
Constitution reads "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a
republican form of government" and my memory of constitutional law is that this
has never been an operative constitutional prevision in our history. That is, I don't
remember this happening and one sees the parallel here. It's very hard politically
even with such a provision to have the central union protect these kinds of rights. So,
if Europe is having trouble with this, all I can say is we tried and we weren't able to
do it. We're no model.
Daniel Kelemen: Yeah, I mean I would agree with that and I wouldjust say two
things on that point on Federico's question. You know one point is, and I mentioned
this in my talk that some of the fundamental values that are supposed to be protected
and guaranteed in all states in article 2 of the treaty including let's say democracy,
they're not actually things that are sort of individually judiciable. So maybe in an
ideal world you'd want the EU to pass, and I don't think this will happen for lots of
reasons but you want them to pass sort of legislation, secondary legislation that gave
a concrete right. So, let's think like a European voting rights act or something but
there is none. Right? So that's-- I mean the closest we've come-- I'm not a US con.
law expert to kind of getting at the issues I think you're talking about is yeah
individuals can bring voting rights act challenges right but there is nothing like that.
So, there's no way that you as a citizen can take advantage of all the powers the EU
legal system has for individuals which are many, right, it makes the system
impressive, but you can't use that against the fact that your country is no longer a
democracy. And then the last thing I'd say, look the EU is developing, it's getting a
lot of power in many sensitive areas but the EU I think will never be a traditional
kind of state. So, the last thing the EU will ever do is like deploy troops to integrate
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a school somewhere. That kind of thing is just not going to happen and so therefore
if you're not going to have real state coercive power from the center I think at the
end of the day the only thing you can have is go back to like the Greek punishment,
banishment, right? So, if you can't force states to do something you have to have a
threat of exclusion, right? You have to say ok, you're not going to take refugees
Hungary? You're out of Schengen. Right? No more free movement for you until you
take-or eventually expulsion from the union. Because it's just a pipedream to think
you'd have force.
Mark Janis: These were knowledgeable choices taken by sensible politicians
after the fall of communism. There was a choice that Europe had which either
bringing in the ex-communist states or not and there was much debate about it
whether or not this made sense. Whether or not it threatened the viability of the
European Union not only in economic terms but even more political terms and I can
remember reports by distinguished groups of lawyers, you probably kncw some
lawyers, saying that you know x or y state should not be brought into Europe because
they didn't have a traditional rule of law, they weren't ready to have democratic
governments and the political leaders said: "yes we understand you but we want to
take the risk." We want to see if whether or not we can imbue these states with these
values back and forth and justice. There have been f efforts that the EU has made
financially in terms of experts and to try to educate the central Europeans in these
forms and sometimes it's worked and other times it really hasn't. So, these were
risks. So, if you will it is just early days yet. We'll come back and do this in 50 years
and you'll tell us what you think. So, we shouldn't be too unjust. I think this is a
good time to wrap up. I promised you the best panel. I delivered.
It had nothing to do with me. It just had to do with the panelists but I want to
say in fairness to the other panels and to Ambassador Vimont that they were great
too and I think the Journal was great and I think the law school was great and I think
the weather was great and I wish you all a very good weekend.
[Vol. 32:2375
